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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the problem of transforming an ε-BIC mechanism into an ex-
actly BIC mechanism without loss of social welfare, working in a general mechanism design
setting. We can transform any ε-BIC mechanism to a BIC mechanism with no loss of social wel-
fare and with additive and negligible revenue loss. We show that the revenue loss bound is tight
given the requirement to maintain social welfare. This is the first ε-BIC to BIC transformation
that preserves welfare and provides negligible revenue loss. Previous ε-BIC to BIC transforma-
tions preserve social welfare but have no revenue guarantee (Bei and Huang, 2011), or suffer
welfare loss while incurring a revenue loss with both a multiplicative and an additive term,
e.g., Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012); Cai and Zhao (2017); Rubinstein and Weinberg (2018).
The revenue loss achieved by our transformation is incomparable to these earlier approaches
and can sometimes be significantly less. We also analyze ε-expected ex-post IC (ε-EEIC) mech-
anisms (Du¨tting et al., 2014), and provide a welfare-preserving transformation with the same
revenue loss guarantee for the special case of uniform type distributions. We give applications
of our methods to both linear-programming based and machine-learning based methods of au-
tomated mechanism design. We also show the impossibility of welfare-preserving, ε-EEIC to
BIC transformations with negligible loss of revenue for non-uniform distributions.
∗Supported by a NSF award CCF-1841550 and Google PhD Fellowship.
1 Introduction
How should one sell a set of goods, given conflicting desiderata of maximizing revenue and welfare,
and considering the strategic behavior of potential buyers? Classic results in mechanism design
provide answers to some extreme points of the above question. If the seller wishes to maximize
revenue and is selling a single good, then theory prescribes Myerson’s optimal auction. If the seller
wishes to maximize social welfare (and is selling any number of goods), then theory prescribes the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.
But in practical applications, one often cares about both revenue and welfare. Consider, for
example, a governmental organization, which we might think of as typically trying to maximize
welfare, but can also reinvest any revenue it collects from, say, a land sale, to increase welfare on a
longer horizon. Similarly, a company, which we might think of as trying to maximize profit, may
also care about providing value to participants for the sake of increasing future participation and, in
turn, longer-term profits. Ultimately, strictly optimizing for welfare may lead to unsustainably low
revenue, while strictly optimizing for revenue may lead to an unsustainably low value to participants.
Indeed, in the online advertising space, there are various works exploring this trade-off between
revenue and welfare. Display advertising has focused on yield optimization (i.e., maximizing a com-
bination of revenue and the quality of ads shown) (Balseiro et al., 2014), and work in sponsored
search auctions has considered a squashing parameter that similarly trades off revenue and qual-
ity (Lahaie and Pennock, 2007). For the general mechanism design problem, however, there is a sur-
prisingly small literature that considers both welfare and revenue together (e.g., Diakonikolas et al.
(2012)).
The reason for this theoretical gap is that optimal economic design is very challenging in the
kinds of multi-dimensional settings where we selling multiple items, for example, such as those that
arise in practice. Recognizing this there is considerable interest in adopting algorithmic approaches
to economic design. These include polynomial-time black-box reductions from multi-dimensional
revenue maximization to the algorithmic problem for virtual welfare optimization e.g.(Cai et al.,
2012b,a, 2013), and the application of methods from linear programming (Conitzer and Sandholm,
2002, 2004) and machine learning (Du¨tting et al., 2014; Feng et al., 2018; Duetting et al., 2019) to
automated mechanism design.
These approaches frequently come with a limitation: the output mechanism may only be ap-
proximately incentive compatible (IC); e.g., the black-box reductions are only approximately IC
when these algorithmic problems are solved in polynomial time, the LP approach works on a
coarsened space to reduce computational cost but achieves an approximately IC mechanism in the
full space, and the machine learning approach trains the mechanism over finite training data that
achieves approximately IC for the real type distribution.
While it is debated whether incentive compatibility may suffice, e.g., (Carroll, 2012; Lubin and Parkes,
2012; Azevedo and Budish, 2019), this does add an additional layer of unpredictability to the per-
formance of a designed mechanism. First, the fact that an agent can gain only a small amount
from deviating does not preclude strategic behavior—perhaps the agent can easily identify a useful
deviation, for example through repeated interactions, that reliably provides increased profit. This
can be a problem when strategic responses lead to an unraveling of the desired economic properties
of the mechanism (we provide such an example in this paper). The possibility of strategic reports
by participants has additional consequences as well, for example making it more challenging for a
designer to confidently measure ex-post welfare after outcomes are realized.
For the above reasons, there is considerable interest in methods to transform an ε-Bayesian
incentive compatible (ε-BIC) mechanism to an exactly BIC mechanism (Daskalakis and Weinberg,
2012; Cai and Zhao, 2017; Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018). In this paper we alslo go beyond ε-BIC
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mechanisms, and also consider ε-expected ex-post IC (ε-EEIC) mechanisms (Du¨tting et al., 2014;
Duetting et al., 2019). The main question we want to answer in this paper is:
Given an ǫ-BIC mechanism, is there an exact BIC mechanism that maintains social
welfare and achieves negligible revenue loss, compared with the original mechanism? If
so, can we find the BIC mechanism efficiently?
1.1 Model and Notation
We consider a general mechanism design setting with a set of n agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent
i has a private type ti. We denote the entire type profile as t = (t1, . . . , tn), which is drawn from a
joint distribution F . Let Fi be the marginal distribution of agent i and Ti be the support of Fi. Let
t−i be the joint type profile of the other agents, F−i be the associated marginal type distribution.
Let T = T1 × · · · × Tn and T−i be the support of F and F−i, respectively. In this setting, there
is a set of feasible outcomes denoted by O, typically an allocation of items to agents. Later in
the paper, we sometimes also use “outcome” to refer to the output of the mechanism, namely the
allocation together with the payments, when this is clear from the context.
We focus on the discrete type setting, i.e., Ti is a finite set containing mi possible types, i.e.,
|Ti| = mi. Let t(j)i denote the jth possible type of agent i, where j ∈ [mi]. For all i and ti,
vi : (ti, o)→ R≥0 is a valuation that maps a type ti and outcome o to a non-negative real number.
A direct revelation mechanism M = (x, p) is a pair of allocation rule xi : T → ∆(O), possibly
randomized, and expected payment rule pi : T → R≥0. We slightly abuse notation, and also use vi
to define the expected value of bidder i for mechanismM, with the expectation taken with respect
to the randomization used by the mechanism, that is
∀i, tˆ ∈ T , vi(ti, x(tˆ)) = Eo∼x(tˆ)[vi(ti, o)], (1)
for true type ti and reported type profile tˆ. When the reported types are tˆ = (tˆ1, . . . , tˆn), the output
of mechanism M for agent i is denoted as Mi(tˆ) = (xi(tˆ), pi(tˆ)). We define the utility of agent i
with true type ti and a reported type tˆi given the reported type profile tˆ−i of other agents as a
quasilinear function,
ui(ti,M(tˆ)) = vi(ti, x(tˆ))− pi(tˆ). (2)
For a multi-agent setting, it will be useful to also define the interim rules.
Definition 1 (Interim Rules of a Mechanism). For a mechanism M with allocation rule x and
payment rule p, the interim allocation rule X and payment rule P are defined as, ∀i, ti ∈ Ti,Xi(ti) =
Et−i∈F−i [xi(ti; t−i)], Pi(ti) = Et−i∈F−i [pi(ti; t−i)].
In this paper, we assume we have oracle access to the interim quantities of mechanism M.
Assumption 1 (Oracle Access to Interim Quantities). For any mechanism M, given any type
profile t = (t1, . . . , tn), we receive the interim allocation rule Xi(ti) and payments Pi(ti), for all
i, ti.
Moreover, we define the menu of a mechanism M in the following way.
Definition 2 (Menu). For a mechanism M, the menu of bidder i is the set {Mi(t)}t∈T . The
menu size of agent i is denoted as |Mi|.
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In mechanism design, there is a focus on designing incentive compatible mechanisms, so that
truthful reporting of types is an equilbrium. This is without loss of generality by the revela-
tion principle. It has also been useful to work with approximate-IC mechanisms, and these
have been studied in various papers, e.g. (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Cai and Zhao, 2017;
Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018; Cai et al., 2019; Du¨tting et al., 2014; Duetting et al., 2019; Feng et al.,
2018; Balcan et al., 2019; Lahaie et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2019), and gained a lot of attention.
In this paper, we focus on two definitions of approximate incentive compatibility, ε-BIC and
ε-expected ex post incentive compatible (ε-EEIC) defined in the following. See Appendix D for
more different versions of approximately IC.
Definition 3 (ε-BIC Mechanism). A mechanism M is called ε-BIC iff for all i, ti,
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(t))] ≥ max
tˆi∈Ti
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(tˆi; t−i))]− ε
Definition 4 (ε-expected ex post IC (ε-EEIC) Mechanism (Du¨tting et al., 2014)). A mechanism
M is ε-EEIC if and only if for all i, Et
[
maxtˆi∈Ti(ui(ti,M(t)) − ui(ti,M(tˆi; t−i)))
] ≤ ǫ.
A mechanism M is ε-EEIC iff no agent can gain more than ε ex post regret, in expectation
over all type profiles t ∈ T (where ex post regret is the amount by which an agent’s utility can be
improved by misreporting to some tˆi given knowledge of t, instead of reporting its true type ti). A
0-EEIC mechanism is strictly DSIC.1 We can also consider an interim version of ε-EEIC, termed
as ε-expected interim IC (ε-EIIC), defined as
Eti∼Fi
[
max
t′i∈Ti
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(ti; t−i))]
]
≥ Eti∼Fi
[
max
t′i∈Ti
Et−i∼F−i
[
ui(ti,M(t′i; t−i))
]]− ε
All our results for ε-EEIC to BIC transformation hold for ε-EIIC mechanism. Indeed, we prove
any ε-EEIC mechanism is ε-EIIC in Lemma 1 in Appendix.
Another important property of the mechanism design is individual rationality (IR), where we
define two standard versions of IR (ex-post/interim IR) in Appendix C. The transformation from
ε-BIC/ε-EEIC to BIC mechanisms, proposed in this paper, preserves the individual rationality,
regardless of interim or ex-post implementation. In other words, if the original ε-BIC/ε-EEIC
mechanism is interim/ex-post IR, the mechanism achieved after transformation is still interim/ex-
post IR, respectively.
For a mechanism M (even an approximate IC mechanism), let RM(F) and WM(F) represent
the expected revenue and social welfare, respectively, of the mechanism when agents’ types are
sampled from F and they play M truthfully.
Definition 5 (Expected Social Welfare and Revenue). For a (approximately IC) mechanism M =
(x, p) with agents’ types drawn from distribution F , the expected revenue is defined as RM(F) =
Et∼F [
∑n
i=1 pi(t)], and the expected social welfare is defined as W
M(F) = Et∼F [
∑n
i=1 vi(ti, x(t))].
In this paper, we focus on welfare-preserving transform that provides negligible revenue loss,
defined in the following,
Definition 6. Given an ε-BIC mechanism M over type distribution F , a welfare-preserving trans-
form that provides negligible revenue loss outputs a mechanism M′ such that, WM′(F) ≥WM(F)
and RM
′
(F) ≥ RM(F)− r(ε), where r(ε)→ 0 if ε→ 0.
1For discrete type settings, 0-EEIC is exactly DSIC. For the continuous type case, a 0-EEIC mechanism is strictly
DSIC up to zero measure events.
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1.2 Previous ε-BIC to BIC transformations
There are existing algorithms for transforming any ε-BIC mechanism to an exactly BIC mechanism
with only negligible revenue loss (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Cai and Zhao, 2017; Rubinstein and Weinberg,
2018). The central tools and reductions in these papers build upon the method of replica-surrogate
matching (Hartline and Lucier, 2010; Hartline et al., 2011; Bei and Huang, 2011). Here we briefly
introduce replica-surrogate matching and its application to an ε-BIC to BIC transformation.
Replica-surrogate matching. For each agent i, construct a bipartite graph Gi = (Ri ∪ Si, E).
The vertices in Ri are called replicas, which are types sampled i.i.d. from the type distribution of
agent i, Fi. The nodes in Si are called surrogates, and also sampled from Fi. In particular, the
true type ti is added in Ri. There is an edge between each replica and each surrogate. The weight
of the edge between a replica r
(j)
i and a surrogate s
(k)
i is induced by the mechanism, and defined as
wi(r
(j)
i , s
(k)) = Et−i∈F−i
[
vi(r
(j)
i , x(s
(k)
i , t−i))
]
− (1− η) · Et−i∈F−i
[
pi(s
(k)
i , t−i)
]
. (3)
The replica-surrogate matching computes the maximum weight matching in Gi.
ε-BIC to BIC transformation by Replica-Surrogate Matching (Daskalakis and Weinberg,
2012). We briefly describe this transformation, deferring the details to Appendix A. Given a mech-
anism M = (x, p), this transformation constructs a bipartite graph between replicas (include the
true type ti) and surrogates, as described above. The approach then runs VCG matching to com-
pute the maximum weighted matching for this bipartite graph, and charges each agent its VCG
payment.For unmatched replicas in the VCG matching, the method randomly matches a surrogate.
Let M′ = (x, (1 − η)p) be the modified mechanism. If the true type ti is matched to a surrogate
si, then agent i uses si to compete in M′. The outcome of M′ is x(s), given matched surrogate
profile s, and the payment of agent i (matched in VCG matching) is (1 − η)pi(s) plus the VCG
payment from the VCG matching, where η is the parameter in replica-surrogate matching . If ti is
not matched in the VCG matching, the agent gets nothing and pay zero.
The revenue loss of the replica-surrogate matching mechanism relative to the orginal mech-
anism M is at most ηRev(M) + O
(
nε
η
)
, which has both a multiplicative and an additive loss
term (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Cai and Zhao, 2017; Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018). More-
over, for n ≥ 1 agents, the transformation does not preserve welfare.2The black-box reduction pro-
posed in Bei and Huang (2011) is a special case of this replica-surrogate matching method, where
the weight of bipartite graph only depends on the valuations and not the prices (η = 1 in Eq. (3)),
and the replicas and surrogates are both Ti (no sampling for replicas and surrogates). For this
reason, the transformation method described there can preserve social welfare but can provide
arbitrarily bad revenue (see Example 1).
1.3 Our Contributions
We first state the main result of the paper, which provides a welfare-preserving transform from
approximate BIC to exact BIC with negligible revenue loss.
Main Theorem 1 (Theorem 6). With n ≥ 1 agents and independent private types, and an ε-BIC
and IR mechanism M that achieves W expected social welfare and R expected revenue, there exists
a BIC and IR mechanism M′ that achieves at least W social welfare and R −∑ni=1 |Ti|ε revenue.
2For single agent, the welfare loss can be bounded by O
(
(1−η)ε
η
)
, by letting the agent with type t choose t′ to
maximize v(t, x(t′))− (1− η)p(t′). However they provide no welfare guarantee for multiple agents.
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Given an oracle access to the interim quantities of M, the running time of the transformation from
M to M′ is at most poly(∑i |Ti|, ε).
Given the interim type graph for each agent, and the valuation function of each agent, our
transformation can be done in poly(
∑n
i=1 |Ti|, ε) time.
The transformation works directly on the type graph of each agent, and it is this that allows
us to maintain social welfare— indeed, we may even improve social welfare in our transformation.
In contrast, the transformation from Bei and Huang (2011) can incur unbounded revenue loss (see
Example 1, it loses all revenue), and existing approaches with negligible revenue loss can lose social
welfare (see Example 1).
Compared with Bei and Huang (2011), the transform described here preserves welfare as well as
providing negligible revenue loss. Compared to approx-BIC to exact-BIC transformations that have
focused on revenue (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Cai and Zhao, 2017; Rubinstein and Weinberg,
2018), these existing transformations may incur welfare loss and incur both a multiplicative and an
additive-loss in revenue, while our revenue loss is additive. Choosing η =
√
ε, the revenue loss of
existing transforms is at most
√
εRev(M)+O(n√ε). In the case that the original revenue, Rev(M),
is order-wise smaller than the number of types, i.e., Rev(M) = o(∑i |Ti|), the existing transforms
provide a better revenue bound (at some cost of welfare loss). But when the revenue is relatively
larger than the number of types, i.e., Rev(M) = Ω(∑i |Ti|), our transformation can achieve strictly
better revenue than these earlier approaches, as well as preserving welfare.
Before describing our techniques, we illustrate the comparision of these properties through a
simple, single agent, two outcome example in Example 1. We show that even for the case that
Rev(M) = o(
∑
i |Ti|), our transformation strictly outperforms existing transforms w.r.t revenue
loss, in some cases.
Example 1. Consider a single agent with m types, T = {t(1), · · · , t(m)}, where the type distribution
is uniform. Suppose there are two outcomes, the agent with type t(j)(j = 1, . . . ,m − 1) values
outcome 1 at 1 and values outcome 2 at 0. The agent with type t(m) values outcome 1 at 1 + ε and
outcome 2 at
√
m. The mechanism M we consider is: if the agent reports type t(j), j ∈ [m− 1], M
gives outcome 1 to the agent with a price of 1, and if the agent reports type t(m), M gives outcome
2 to the agent with a price of
√
m. M is ε-BIC, because the agent with type t(m) has a regret ε. The
expected revenue achieved by M is 1+
√
m−1
m . In addition, M maximizes social welfare, 1+
√
m−1
m .
Our transformation decreases the payment of type t(m) by ε for a loss of εm revenue and preserves
the social welfare.
The transformation by Bei and Huang (2011) preserves the social welfare, however, the VCG
payment (envy-free prices) is 0 for each type. Therefore, Bei and Huang (2011)’s approach loses
all revenue.
Moreover, the approaches by replica-surrogate matching (with negligible revenue loss) will lose
at least εm +
ε√
m−1 revenue, which is about (
√
m + 1) times larger than the revenue loss of our
transformation. We argue this claim by a case analysis,
• If η ≥ ε√
m−1 , the VCG matching is the identical matching and the VCG payment is 0 for
each type. In total, the agent loses at least η ·
√
m+m−1
m ≥ εm + ε√m−1 expected revenue.
• If η < ε√
m−1 , the agent with type t
(m) will be assigned outcome 1 (t(m) is matched to some
t(j), j ∈ [m− 1], in VCG matching) and the VCG payment is η. Thus, type t(m) loses at least√
m− (1− η)− η = √m− 1 revenue. For any type t(j), j ∈ [m− 1], if t(j) is matched in VCG
matching, the VCG payment is 0, since it will be matched to another type t(k), k ∈ [m − 1].
Each type t(j), j ∈ [m − 1] loses at least η revenue. Overall the agent loses at least
√
m−1
m
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expected revenue. In addition, since the type t(m) is assigned outcome 1, we lose at least√
m−1−ε
m expected social welfare.
In any case, there is a chance that the type is not matched, then it reduces the social welfare strictly.
We also work with the approximate IC concept of ε-expected ex-post IC (ε-EEIC). This is
motivated by work on the use of machine learning to achieve approximately IC mechanisms for
multi-dimensional settings. EEIC is a smoother metric, and can be minimized through standard
machine learning pipeline, such as SVM (Du¨tting et al., 2014) and deep learning with an SGD
solver (Feng et al., 2018; Duetting et al., 2019). In particular, ε-EEIC has been leveraged within
the RegretNet framework (Duetting et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2018). A concern with the ε-EEIC
metric, relative to ε-BIC, is that it differs in only guaranteeing at most ε gain in expectation over
type profiles, with no guarantee for any particular type (in general, it is incomparable in strength
from ǫ-BIC because at the same time, ε-EEIC strengthens ε-BIC in working with ex post regret
rather than interim regret).
Our second main result shows how to transform an approximate, ε-expected ex-post IC (ε-
EEIC) mechanism to a BIC mechanism.
Main Theorem 2 (Informal Theorem 5 and Theorem 6). For multiple agents with independent
uniform type distribution, our ε-BIC to BIC transformation can be applied for ε-EEIC mechanism
and all results in Informal Main Theorem 1 hold here. For a non-uniform type distribution, we show
an impossibility result for a ε-EEIC to BIC, welfare-preserving transformation with only negligible
revenue loss, even for the single agent case.
Moreover, we also argue that our revenue loss bounds are tight given the requirement to maintain
social welfare. This holds for both ε-BIC mechanisms and ε-EEIC mechanisms for multiple agents
with independent uniform type distribution, summarized in the following theorem.
Main Theorem 3 (Informal Theorem 2 and Theorem 7). There exists an ε-BIC/ε-EEIC and IR
mechanism for n ≥ 1 agents with independent uniform type distribution, for which any welfare-
preserving transformation must suffer at least Ω(
∑
i |Ti|ε) revenue loss.
Finally, we show the application of our transformation to Automated Mechanism Design in
Section 5, where we apply our transformation to linear-programming based and machine learning
based approaches to maximize a linear combination of expected revenue and social welfare as
follows,
µλ(M,F) = (1− λ)RM(F) + λWM(F),
for some λ ∈ [0, 1] and type distribution F . We summarize our results for the application of our
transformation to LP-based and machine learning based approaches to AMD informally in the
following theorem.
Main Theorem 4 (Informal Theorem 10 and Theorem 11). For n agents with independent type dis-
tribution ×ni=1Fi on T = T1×· · ·×Tn and an α-approximation LP algorithm ALG to output an ε-BIC
(ε-EEIC) and IR mechanism M on F with µλ(M,F) ≥ αOPT, there exists a BIC and IR mecha-
nismM′, s.t., µλ(M′,F) ≥ αOPT−(1−λ)
∑n
i=1 |Ti|ε. Given oracle access to the interim quantities
of M, the running time to output the mechanism M′ is at most poly(∑i=1 |Ti|, ε, rtALG(x)), where
rtALG(·) is the running time of ALG and x is the bit complexity of the input. Similar results hold for
a machine learning based approach, in a PAC learning manner.
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1.4 Our Techniques
Instead of constructing a bipartite replica-surrogate graph, our transformation makes use of a
directed, weighted type graph, one for each agent. For simplicity of exposition, we take the single
agent with uniform type distribution case as an example. Given an ε-BIC mechanism, M, we
construct a graph G = (T , E), where each node represents a possible type of the agent and there
is an edge from node t(j) to t(k) if the output of the mechanism for type t(k) is weakly preferred by
the agent for true type t(j) in M, i.e. u(t(j),M(t(k))) ≥ u(t(j),M(t(j))). The weight wjk of edge
(t(j), t(k)) is defined as the regret of type t(j) by not misreporting t(k), i.e.,
wjk = u(t
(j),M(t(k)))− u(t(j),Mε(t(j))). (4)
Our transformation then iterates over the following two steps, constructing a transformed mech-
anism from the original mechanism. We briefly introduce the two steps here and defer to Figure 2
for detailed description.
Step 1. If there is a cycle C in the type graph with at least one positive-weight edge, then all
types in this cycle weakly prefer their descendant in the cycle and one or more strictly prefers their
descendant. In this case, we “rotate” the allocation and payment of types against the direction of
the cycle, to let each type receive a weakly better outcome compared with its current outcome. We
repeat Step 1 until all cycles in the type graph are removed.
Step 2. We pick a source node, if any, with a positive-weight outgoing edge (and thus regret
for truthful reporting). We decrease the payment made by this source node, as well as decreasing
the payment made by each one of its ancestors by the same amount, until we create a new edge
in the type graph with weight zero, such that the modification to payments is about to increase
regret for some type. If we create a cycle, we move to Step 1. Otherwise, we repeat Step 2 until
there are no source nodes with positive-weight, outgoing edges.
The algorithm works on the type graph induced by the original, approximately IC mechanism,
M, and directly modifies the mechanism for each type, to make the mechanism IC. This allows
the transformation can preserve welfare and provides negligible revenue loss. Step 2 has no effect
on welfare, since it only changes (interim) payment for each type. Step 1 is designed to remove
cycles created in Step 2 so that we can run Step 2, while preserving welfare simultaneously. Both
steps reduce the total weight of the type graph, which is equivalent to reduce the regret in the
mechanism to make it IC. We illustrate how our transformation works in Fig. 1, in high level. For
example, in Example 1, there is no cycle in the type graph. We only need to run Step 2, that is
reduce the payment of type t(m) by ε to make the approximately IC mechanism IC.
For a single agent with non-uniform type distribution, to handle the unbalanced density prob-
ability of each type, we redefine the type graph, where the weight of the edge in type graph is
weighted by the product of the probability of the two nodes that are incident to an edge. We
propose a new Step 1 by introducing fractional rotation, such that for each cycle in the type graph,
we rotate the allocation and payment with a fraction for any type t(j) in the cycle. By carefully
choosing the fraction for each type in the cycle, we can argue that our transformation preserve
welfare and provides negligible revenue loss.
For the multi-agent setting, we reduce it to the single-agent case. In particular, we build a type
graph for each agent induced by the interim rules (see more details in Appendix D.6 for construction
of the type graph). Suppose we have oracle access to the interim quantities (Assumption 1) of
original mechanism, we can build the type graph of each agent i in poly(|Ti|) time.3 We then
3If we only have oracle access to the ex-post quantities, we need at least poly(
∏
j 6=i |Tj |) time to build the type
graph of agent i.
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t(2)
t(3)t(1)
t(l)
t(1)
t(2)
Step 1
Step 2Update the graph
Update the graph
Type graph G = (T , E)
t(1)
The ancestors of t(1)
t′
Figure 1: Visualization of the transformation for a single agent with a uniform type distribution: we start
from a type graph G(T , E), where each edge (t(1), t(2)) represents the agent weakly prefers the allocation
and payment of type t(2) rather than his true type t(1). The weight of each edge is denoted in Eq. (4). In the
graph, we use solid lines to represent the positive-weight edges, and dashed lines to represent zero-weight
edges. We first find a shortest cycle, and rotate the allocation and payment along the cycle and update the
graph (Step 1). We keep doing Step 1 to remove all cycles. Then we pick a source node t(1), and decrease
the payment of type t(1) and all the ancestors of t(1) until we reduce the weight of one outgoing edge from
t(1) to zero or we create a new zero-weight edge from t′ to t(1) or one of the ancestors of t(1) (Step 2).
apply our transformation for each type graph of agent i, induced by the interim rules. This is
analogous to the spirit of ε-BIC to BIC transformation by replica-surrogate matching, as they also
define the weights between replicas and surrogates by interim rules and they only need to run
the replica-surrogate matching for the reported type of each agent. The existing approaches use
the sampling technique in replica-surrogate matching to make the distribution of reported type
of each agent is equal to the distribution of true type. However, in our transformation, both
Step 1 and Step 2 don’t change the type distribution so that our transformation guarantees this
property for free. Then we can apply our transformation for each type graph separately. The
new challenge in our transformation is feasibility, i.e., establishing consistency of the agent-wise
rotations to interim quantities. We show the transformation for each type graph guarantees the
feasibility of the mechanism by appeal to Border’s lemma (Border, 1991). Our transformation can
be directly applied to ε-EEIC mechanism, in the case that each agent has an independent uniform
type distribution.
1.5 Further related work
Dughmi et al. (2017) propose a general transformation from any black-box algorithm A to a BIC
mechanism that only incurs negligible loss of welfare, with only polynomial number queries to A,
by using Bernoulli factory techniques. Concurrently and independently, Cai et al. (2019) propose a
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polynomial time algorithm to transform any ε-BIC mechanism to an exactly BIC mechanism, with
only sample access to the type distribution and query access to the original ε-BIC mechanism. Their
technique builds on the replica-surrogate matching mechanism (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012),
and (Dughmi et al., 2017), by extending replica-surrogate matching to handle negative weights in
the graph. Cai et al. (2019) achieve additive revenue loss O(n√ε), however, they assume the value
is bou nded by [0, 1], and their approach cannot preserve social welfare. Other work has needed
to transform an infeasible, but IC mechanism into a feasible and IC mechanism. In particular,
Narasimhan and Parkes (2016) use a method from Hashimoto (2018) to correct for feasibility vi-
olations in assignment mechanisms that result from statistical machine learning, while preserving
strategy-proofness.
2 Warm-up: Single agent with Uniform Type Distribution
In this section, we consider the case of a single agent and a uniformly distributed type distribution
F , i.e. ∀j ∈ [m], f(t(j)) = 1m . Even for this simple case, the proof is non-trivial. Moreover, the
technique for this simple case can be extended to handle more intricate cases. The main result for
a single agent and a uniform type distribution is Theorem 1, which makes use of a constructive
proof to modify a ε-EEIC/ε-BIC mechanism to a BIC mechanism.
An interesting observation is that ε-EEIC is mε-BIC for uniform type distribution, which indi-
cates that transforming ε-EEIC may incur a worse revenue loss bound. However, Theorem 1 shows
we can achieve the exactly same revenue loss bound for both IC definitions.
Theorem 1. Consider a single agent, with m different types T = {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(m)}, and a
uniform type distribution F . Given an ǫ-EEIC/ε-BIC and IR mechanism M, which achieves W
expected social welfare and R expected revenue, there exists an BIC and IR mechanism M′ that
achieves at least W expected social welfare and R−mε revenue. Given an oracle access to M, the
running time of the transformation from M to M′ is at most poly(|T |, ε).
Proof Sketch. We construct a weighted directed graph G = (T , E) induced by mechanism M,
following the approach shown in Section 1.4. We apply the iterations of Step 1 and Step 2 (see
Fig. 2), to reduce the total weight of edges in E to zero.
Firstly, we show the transformation maintains IR, since neither Step 1 nor Step 2 reduces utility.
We then argue that the transformation in Fig. 2 will reduce the total weight of the graph to zero
with no loss of social welfare, and incur at most mε revenue loss. To show this, we prove the
following two auxiliary claims in Appendix D.1 and D.2, respectively.
Claim 1. Each Step 1 achieves the same revenue and incurs no loss of social welfare, and reduces
the total weight of the graph by at least the weights of cycle C.
Claim 2. Each Step 2 can only create new edges with zero weight, and does not decrease social
welfare. Each Step 2 will reduce the weight of each positive-weight, outgoing edge associated with t
by min{εt, εt}, where ε¯t and εt are defined in Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) respectively.
Given the above two claims, we argue our transformation incurs no loss of social welfare.
The transformation only loses revenue at Step 2, for each source node t, we decrease at most
mmin{εt, εt} payments over all the types4. In this transformation, after each Step 1 or Step 2, the
weight of the outgoing edge of each node t is still bounded by maxj
{
u(t,M(t(j)))− u(t,M(t))}.
4Actually, we can get a slightly tighter bound. Since no cycle exists in the type graph after Step 1, there is at
least one node is not the ancestor of t. Therefore the revenue decrease is bounded by (m− 1)min{εt, εt}, actually.
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Step 1 (Rotation step). Given the graph G induced by M = (x, p), find the shortest cycle C
in G that contains at least one edge with positive weight. Without loss of generality, we represent
C = {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(l)}. Then rotate the allocation and payment rules for these nodes in cycle
C. Now we slightly abuse the notation of subscripts, s.t. t(l+1) = t(1). Specifically, the allocation
and payment rules for each t(j) ∈ C, x′(t(j)) = x(t(j+1)), p′(t(j)) = p(t(j+1)). For other nodes,
we keep the allocation and payment rules, i.e. ∀j /∈ [l], x′(t(j)) = x(t(j)), p′(t(j)) = p(t(j)). Then
we update the mechanism M by adopting allocation and payment rules x′, p′ to form a new
mechanism M′, and update the graph G (We still use G to represent the updated graph for
notation simplicity). If there are no cycles in G that contain at least one positive-weight-edge,
move to Step 2. Otherwise, we repeat Step 1.
Step 2 (Payment reducing step). Given the current updated graph G and mechanism M′,
pick up a source node t, i.e., a node with no incoming positive-weight edges. Let outgoing
edges with positive weights associated with node t be a set of Et, and let εt be the minimum
non-negative regret of type t, i.e.
εt = min
t(j):(t,t(j))∈Et
[
u(t,M′(t(j)))− u(t,M′(t))
]
(5)
Consider the following set of nodes St ⊆ T , such that St = {t} ∪ {t′
∣∣t′ ∈ T is the ancestor of t}.
The weight zero edge is also counted as a directed edge. Denote εt as
εt = min
t′ /∈St,t¯∈St
[
u(t′,M′(t′))− u(t′,M′(t¯))] (6)
Then we decrease the expected payment of all t¯ ∈ St by min{εt, εt}. This process will only create
new edges with weight zero. If we create a new cycle with at least one edge with positive weight
in E, we move to Step 1. Otherwise, we repeat Step 2.
Figure 2: ε-BIC/ε-EEIC to BIC transformation for single agent with uniform type distribution
This is because Step 1 does not create new outcome (allocation and payment) and Step 2 will
not increase the weight of each edge. Therefore, in Step 2, we decrease payments by at most
mmaxj
{
u(t,M(t(j)))− u(t,M(t))} in order to reduce the weights of all outgoing edges associated
with t to zero. Therefore, the total revenue loss in expectation is∑
t∈T
1
m
·mmax
j
(
u(t,M(t(j)))− u(t,M(t))
)
≤ mε,
where the inequality is because of the definition of ε-BIC/ε-EEIC mechanism.
Running time. At each Step 1 and Step 2, we strictly reduce the total weight of the type graph
by a positive amount. Suppose we have the oracle access to the original mechanism, we can build
the type graph in ploy(m) time for single agent case. Therefore the transformation can be done in
ploy(|T |, ε).5
5Actually, we can think about the value and payment of each type are both multiplies of a unit ”1”. The total
weight of the type graph is bounded by m2ε units. At each Step 1 or Step 2, we strictly reduce the total weight by
at least 1 unit. Then the transformation runs at most m2ε steps to finish.
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2.1 Lower Bound on Revenue Loss
In our transformation shown in Figure 2, the revenue loss is bounded by mε. The following theorem
shows that this revenue loss bound is tight, up to a constant factor, while insisting on maintaining
social welfare.
Theorem 2. There exists an ε-BIC (ε-EEIC) and IR mechanism M for a single agent, for which
any ε-BIC and IR to BIC and IR transformation (without loss of social welfare) must suffer at
least Ω(mε) revenue loss.
Proof. Consider a single agent with m types, T = {t(1), · · · , t(m)} and f(t(j)) = 1/m,∀j. There
are m possible outcomes. The agent with type t(1) values outcome 1 at ε and the other outcomes
at 0. For any type t(j), j ≥ 2, the agent with type t(j) values outcome j − 1 at jε, outcome j at
jε, and the other outcomes at 0. The original mechanism is: if the agent reports type t(j), gives
the outcome j to the agent and charges jε. There is a ε regret to an agent with type t(j+1) for not
reporting type t(j), thus the mechanism is ε-BIC. Since this ε-BIC mechanism already maximizes
social welfare, we cannot change the allocation in the transformation. Thus, we can only change
the payment of each type to reduce the regret. Consider the sink node t(1), to reduce the regret of
the agent with type t(2) for not reporting t(1), we can increase the payment of type t(1) or decrease
the payment of type t(2). However, increasing the payment of type t(1) breaks IR, then we can only
decrease the payment of t(2). To reduce the regret between t(2) to t(1), we need to decrease the
payment of t(2) at least by ε. After this step, the regret of type t(3) for not reporting t(2) will be at
least 2ε and t(2) will be the new sink node. Similarly, t(3) needs to decrease at least 2ε payment (if
t(2) increase the payment, it will envy the output of t(1) again). So on and so forth, and in total,
the revenue loss is at least ε+2ε+···+(m−1)εm =
(m−1)ε
2 .
2.2 Tighter Bound of Revenue Loss for Settings with Finite Menus
In some settings, the total number of possible types of an agent may be very large, and yet the
menu size can remain relatively small. In particular, suppose that a mechanism M has a small
number of outputs, i.e., |M| = C and C ≪ m, where m is the number of types and C is the menu
size. Given this, we can provide a tighter bound on revenue loss for this setting. See Appendix D.3
for the complete proof.
Theorem 3. Consider a single agent with m different types T = {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(m)}, sampled from
a uniform type distribution F . Given an ǫ-BIC mechanim M with C different menus (C ≪ m)
that achieves S expected social welfare and R revenue, there exists an BIC mechanism M′ that
achieves at least S social welfare and R− Cε revenue.
3 Single Agent with General Type Distribution
In this section, we consider a setting with a single agent that has a non-uniform type distribution.
A naive idea is that we can “divide” a type with a larger probability to several copies of the same
type, each with equal probability, and then apply our proof of Theorem 1 to get a BIC mechanism.
However, this would result in a weak bound on the revenue loss, since we would divide the m types
into multiple, small pieces. This section is divided into two parts. First we show our transformation
for an ε-BIC mechanism in this setting. Second, we show an impossibility result for an ε-EEIC
mechanism, that is, without loss of welfare, no transformation can achieve negligible revenue loss.
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3.1 ε-BIC to BIC Transformation
We propose a novel approach for a construction for the case of a single agent with a non-uniform
type distribution. The proof is built upon Theorem 1, however, there is a technical difficulty to
directly apply the same approach for this non-uniform type distribution case. Since each type has
a different probability, we cannot rotate the allocation and payment in the same way as in Step 1
in the proof of Theorem 1.
We instead redefine the type graph G = (T , E), where the weight of the edge is now weighted
by the product of the probability of the two nodes that are incident to an edge. We also modify
the original rotation step shown in Fig. 2 in Appendix D.4: for each cycle in the type graph, we
rotate the allocation and payment with the fraction of f(t
(k))
f(t(j))
for any type t(j) in the cycle, where
f(t(k)) is the smallest type probability of the types in the cycle. This step is termed as ”fractional
rotation step.” We summarize the results in Theorem 4 and show the proof in Appendix D.4.
Theorem 4. Consider a single agent with m different types, T = {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(m)} drawn from
a general type distribution F . Given an ε-BIC and IR mechanim M that achieves W expected
social welfare and R expected revenue, there exists a BIC and IR mechanism M′ that achieves at
least W social welfare and R−mε revenue.
3.2 Impossibility Result for ε-EEIC Transformation
As mentioned above, given any ε-BIC for single agent with general type distribution, we can always
transform to an exactly BIC mechanism, which incurs no loss of social welfare and negligible loss
of revenue. However, the same claim doesn’t hold for ε-EEIC, and Theorem 5 shows that, without
loss of social welfare, no transformation can achieve negligible revenue loss. The complete proof of
this result is provided in Appendix D.5.
Theorem 5. There exists a single agent with a non-uniform type distribution, and an ε-EEIC and
IR mechanism, for which any IC transformation (without loss of social welfare and IR) cannot
achieve negligible revenue loss.
4 Multiple Agents with Independent Private Types
First, we state our positive result for a setting with multiple agents and independent, private types
(Theorem 6). We assume each agent i’s type ti is independent drawn from Fi, i.e. F is a product
distribution can be denoted as ×ni=1Fi. Given any ε-BIC mechanism for n agents with independent
private types (or any ε-EEIC mechanism for n agents with independent uniform type distribution),
we show how to construct an exactly BIC mechanism with at least as much welfare and negligible
revenue loss.
Theorem 6. With n agents and independent private types, and an ε-BIC and IR mechanism
Mε that achieves W expected social welfare and R expected revenue, there exists a BIC and IR
mechanism M that achieves at least W social welfare and R−∑ni=1 |Ti|ε revenue. The same result
holds for an ε-EEIC mechanism with multiple agents, in the case that each agent has an independent
uniform type distribution. Given an oracle access to the interim quantities of M, the running time
of the transformation from M to M′ is at most poly(∑i |Ti|, ε).
Proof Sketch. We construct a separate type graph for each agent, based on the mechanism induced
by the interim rules. We then prove the induced mechanism for each agent is still ε-BIC or
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ε-EEIC. Then we apply our transformation for each type graph separately. Finally, we argue
that our transformation maintains feasibility by Border’s lemma. The complete proof is shown in
Appendix D.6.
Lower bound of revenue loss. Similarly to single agent case, we can also prove the lower
bound of revenue loss of any welfare-preserving transformation for multiple agents with independent
private types. We summarize this result in Theorem 7 and show the proof in Appendix D.7.
Theorem 7. There exists an ε-BIC/ε-EEIC and IR mechanism for n ≥ 1 agents with independent
uniform type distribution, for which any welfare-preserving transformation must suffer at least
Ω(
∑
i |Ti|ε) revenue loss.
4.1 Impossibility Results
In our main positive result (Theorem 6), we assume each agent’s type is independent and the
target of transformation is BIC mechanism. In this section, we argue that these two assumptions
are near-tight, in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9. See Appendix D.8 and Appendix D.9 for complete
proofs.
Theorem 8 (Failure of interdependent type). There exists an ε-BIC mechanism M w.r.t an
interdependent type distribution F (see Appendix C), such that no BIC mechanism over F can
achieve negligible revenue loss compared with M.
Theorem 9 (Failure of DSIC target). There exists an ε-BIC mechanism M defined on a type dis-
tribution F , such that any DSIC mechanism over F cannot achieve negligible revenue loss compared
with M.
Theorem 8 provides a counterexample to show that if we allow for interdependent types, there is
no way to construct a BIC mechanism without negligible revenue loss compared with the original
ε-BIC mechanism, even if we ignore the social welfare loss. This leaves an open question that
whether we can construct a counterexample for ε-BIC mechanism for correlated types. Note that
Theorem 9 shows the impossibility result for the setting that we start from an ε-BIC mechanism.
What if we start from an ε-EEIC mechanism M with independent uniform type distribution, can
we get a DSIC mechanism with the similar properties to M? We leave open the question as to
whether it is possible to transform an ε-EEIC mechanism to a DSIC mechanism with zero loss of
social welfare and negligible loss of revenue, for multiple agents with independent uniform type
distribution.
5 Application to Automated Mechanism Design
In this section, we show how to apply our transformation to linear-programming based and machine-
learning based approaches to automated mechanism design (AMD) (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002),
where the mechanism is automatically created for the setting and objective at hand. For this
illustrative application, we take as the target of MD that of maximizing the following objective, for
a given λ ∈ [0, 1] and type distribution F ,
µλ(M,F) = (1− λ)RM(F) + λWM(F). (7)
Let OPT = maxM:M is BIC and IR µλ(M,F) be the optimal objective achieved by a BIC and IR
mechanism defined on F . We consider two different AMD approaches, an LP-based approach and
the RegretNet approach. We briefly introduce the above two approaches in the following.
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LP-based AMD. In practice, the type space of each agent Ti may be very large (e.g., exponential
in the number of items for multi-item auctions). To address this challenge, we can discretize Ti
to a coarser space T +i , (|T +i | ≪ |Ti|) and construct the coupled type distribution F+i . (e.g., by
rounding down to the nearest points in T +i , that is, the mass of each point in Ti is associated with
the nearest point in T +i .) Then we can apply an LP-based AMD approach for type distribution
F+ = (F+1 , · · · ,F+n ). See Appendix E for more details of LP-based AMD. Suppose, in particular,
that we have an α-approximation LP algorithm to output an ε-BIC and IR mechanism M over
F ,6 such that µλ(M,F) ≥ αOPT. Combining with our transformation for M on F , we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 10 (LP-based AMD). For n agents with independent type distribution ×ni=1Fi, and an
LP-based AMD approach for coarsened distribution F+ on coarsened type space T + that gives an
ε-BIC and IR mechanism M on F , with (1 − λ)R + λW ≥ αOPT, for some λ ∈ [0, 1], and some
α ∈ (0, 1), then there exists a BIC and IR mechanism M′ such that
µλ(M′,F) ≥ αOPT− (1− λ)
n∑
i=1
|Ti|ε.
Given oracle access to the interim quantities of M on F and an α-approximation LP solver
with running time rtLP (x), where x is the bit complexity of the input, the running time to output
the mechanism M′ is at most poly(∑i |Ti|, ε, rtLP (poly(∑i |T +i |, 1ε )).
RegretNet AMD. RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019) is a generic data-driven, deep learning frame-
work for multi-dimensional mechanism design. See Appendix E for more details of RegretNet. Sup-
pose that RegretNet is used in a setting with independent, uniform type distribution F . To train
RegretNet, we randomly draw S samples from F to form a training data S and train our model
on S. Let H be the functional space modeled by RegretNet. Suppose, in particular, that there is
a PAC learning algorithm to train RegretNet which outputs an ε-EEIC mechanism M ∈ H on F ,
such that µλ(M,F) ≥ supMˆ∈H µλ(Mˆ,F) − ε holds with probability at least 1 − δ, by observing
S = S(ε, δ) i.i.d samples from F . Combining with our transformation for M on F , we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 11 (RegretNet AMD). For n agents with independent uniform type distribution ×ni=1Fi
over T = (T1, · · · ,Tn), and the use of RegretNet that generates an ε-EEIC and IR mechanism
M on F with µλ(M,F) ≥ supMˆ∈H µλ(Mˆ,F) − ε holds with probability at least 1 − δ, for some
λ ∈ [0, 1], trained on S = S(ε, δ) i.i.d samples from F , where H is the functional (mechanism)
class modeled by RegretNet, then there exists a BIC and IR mechanism M′, with probability at least
1− δ, such that
µλ(M′,F) ≥ sup
Mˆ∈H
µλ(Mˆ,F)− (1− λ)
n∑
i=1
|Ti|ε− ε,
Given oracle access to the interim quantities of M on F and an PAC learning algorithm for
RegretNet with running time rtRegretNet(x), where x is the bit complexity of the input, the running
time to output the mechanism M′ is at most poly(∑i |Ti|, ε, rtRegretNet(poly(S, 1ε )).
6Even though LP returns an mechanism defined only on T +, the mechanism M can be defined on T , by coupling
technique. For example, given any type profile t ∈ T , there is a coupled t+ ∈ T + and the mechanism M takes t+ as
the input.
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6 Conclusion and Open Questions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel ε-BIC to BIC transformation that achieves negligible
revenue loss and with no loss in social welfare. In particular, the transformation only incurs at
most
∑
i |Ti|ε revenue loss, and no loss of social welfare. We also proved that this revenue loss bound
is tight given the requirement that the transform should maintain social welfare. In addition, we
investigated how to transform an ε-EEIC mechanism to an BIC mechanism, without loss of social
welfare and with only negligible revenue loss.
We have demonstrated that the transformation can be applied to an ε-EEIC mechanism with
multiple agents, in the case that each agent has a independent uniform type distribution. For a
non-uniform type distribution, we have established an impossibility result for ε-EEIC transforms,
and even for the single-agent case.
This is the first work that contributes to approximately IC to IC transformation without loss
of welfare. There remain some interesting open questions:
• Can we design a polynomial time algorithm for this ε-BIC to BIC transformation with negligi-
ble revenue loss and without loss of welfare, given only query access to the original mechanism
and sample access to type distribution? (our polynomial time results assume oracle access to
the interim quantities)
• Is it possible to transform an ε-EEIC mechanism to a DSIC mechanism, for multiple agents
with an independent, uniform type distribution, without loss of welfare, and with only negli-
gible revenue loss?
• If we only focus on the revenue perspective, is it possible to find a ε-EEIC to DSIC transfor-
mation, perhaps even in the non-uniform case?
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Appendix
A Details of Replica-Surrogate Mechanism
We show the detailed description of Replica-Surrogate Mechanism in Fig. 3.
B Omitted Properties of Our Transformation
We state an additional property for our transformation. For a mechanismM = (x, p), let X denote
the induced allocation space, such that ∀a ∈ X , there always exists t ∈ T to satisfy a = x(t). We
introduce the following preserved-allocation property.
Definition 7 (Preserved-allocation property). Let X and X ′ denote the induced allocation space for
M andM′ respectively. MechanismM′ = (x′, p′) preserves the allocation of mechanismM = (x, p)
if, ∀a ∈ X , a must be in X ′ and ∑t:x(t)=a f(t) =∑t′:x′(t′)=a f(t′).
This is a useful property, because it states that the same distribution on allocations is achieved
by M′ as the original mechanism M. Consider, for example, a principal running the mechanism
who also incurs a cost for different outcomes. With this preserved allocation property, then not only
is welfare the same (or better) and revenue loss bounded, but the expected cost of the principal is
preserved by the transform. By contrast, the previous transformations (Daskalakis and Weinberg,
2012; Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018; Cai and Zhao, 2017; Cai et al., 2019) cannot preserve the
distribution of the allocation, even for this single agent with uniform type distribution case.
The following corollary states that, in our transformation for single agent with a uniform type
distribution, the BIC mechanism M (achieved by transformation) has the same distribution on
allocations as the original ε-BIC/ε-EEIC mechanism, M.
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Phase 1: Surrogate Sale. For each agent i,
• Modify mechanismM to multiply all prices it charges by a factor of (1− η). LetM′ be
the mechanism resulting from this modification.
• Given the reported type ti, create r − 1 replicas sampled i.i.d from Fi and r surrogates
sampled i.i.d from Fi. r is the parameter of the algorithm to be decided later.
• Construct a weighted bipartite graph between replicas (including agent i’s true type ti)
and surrogates. The weight of the edge between a replica r(j) and a surrogate s(k) is the
interim utility of agent i when he misreports type s(k) rather than the true type r(j) in
mechanism M′, i.e.,
wi(r
(j), s(k)) = Et−i∈F−i
[
vi(r
(j), x(s(k), t−i))
]
− (1− η) · Et−i∈F−i
[
pi(s
(k), t−i)
]
• Let wi((r(j), s(k))) be the value of replica r(j) for being matched to surrogate s(k). Com-
pute the VCG matching and prices, that is, compute the maximum weighted matching
w.r.t wi(·, ·) and the corresponding VCG payments. If a replica is unmatched in the
VCG matching, match it to a random unmatched surrogate.
Phase 2: Surrogate Competition.
• Let ~si denote the surrogate chosen to represent agent i in phase 1, and let ~s be the entire
surrogate profile. We let the surrogates ~s play M′.
• If agent i’s true type ti is matched to a surrogate through VCG matching, charge agent
i the VCG price that he wins the surrogate and award (allocate) agent i, xi(s) (Note
M′ also charges agent i, (1 − η)pi(s)). If agent i’s true type is not matched in VCG
matching and matched to a random surrogate, the agent gets nothing and pays 0.
Figure 3: Replica-Surrogate Matching Mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Preserved allocation for uniform type distribution). Consider a single agent with
a uniform type distribution, then for any ε-BIC/ε-EEIC mechanism M there exists a fully IC
mechanism M′ that preserves the allocation of M.
For single agent with a non-uniform type distribution, the technique used in the proof of The-
orem 4 does not satisfy this preserved-allocation property, since we use ”fractional rotation step”
to diminish weight (regret) in the type graph, which creates some new allocations.
The following theorem shows that this is not attributed to our technique: no mechanism that
satisfies the preserved-allocation property can also achieve negligible revenue loss compared with
the original ε-BIC mechanism.
Theorem 12 (Non preserved-allocation for non-uniform type distribution). There exists an ε-BIC
mechanism M with a single agent, such that no BIC mechanism can preserve the distribution of
the allocation of M.
Proof. There are two items A,B with a single, unit-demand agent. With probability 1/6, the agent
has value 1 + ε for item A and value 1 for item B. With probability 2/3, the agent has value 1 for
item A and value (1 + ε) for item B. With probability 1/6, the agent has value 1 for each of items
A and B.
There exists an ε-BIC deterministic mechanism: ask the agent which item it prefers, and allocate
the other item to the agent and charge 1. This is obviously an ε-DSIC (ε-EEIC) mechanism, since
the agent can only gain an additional ε by misreporting. The allocation under truth-telling is
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(1, 0) with probability at least 2/3. For any strictly IC mechanism, by weak monotonicity, for type
(1, 1+ε) the allocation probability of item A must be smaller than the allocation probability of item
B. Then the induced allocation space of strictly IC mechanism contains (a, 1− a) with probability
at least 2/3, where 0 < a < 1.
C Omitted Definitions
Definition 8 (DSIC/ε-DSIC/BIC/ε-BIC Mechanism). A mechanism M is called ε-BIC iff for all
i, ti:
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(t))] ≥ max
tˆi∈Ti
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(tˆi; t−i))]− ε
In other words, M is ε-BIC iff any agent will not gain more than ε by misreporting tˆi instead of
true type ti. Similarly, M is ε-DSIC iff for all i, ti, tˆi, t−i : ui(ti,M(t)) ≥ ui(ti,M(tˆi; t−i))− ε.
A mechanism is called BIC iff it is 0-BIC and DSIC iff it is 0-DSIC.
Definition 9 (Individual Rationality). A BIC/ε-BIC mechanism M satisfies interim individual
rationality (interim IR) iff for all i, vi:
Et−i∼F−i [ui(ti,M(t))] ≥ 0
This becomes ex-post individual rationality (ex-post IR) iff for all i, ti, t−i, ui(ti,M(t)) ≥ 0 with
probability 1, over the randomness of the mechanism.
Definition 10 (Interdependent private type). Each agent i ∈ [n] has a private signal si, which
captures her private information and the type of every agent ti depends on the entire signal profile,
s = (s1, · · · , sn).
D Omitted Proofs
D.1 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. First, in Step 1, since we only rotate the allocation and payment of nodes in C, the total
weight of the edges from nodes in T \C to nodes in C remains the same. Second, each node in C
achieves a utility no worse than before, so that the weight of each outgoing edge from nodes in C to
nodes in T \C will not increase. Third, since C is the shortest cycle, there are no other edges among
nodes in C in addition to edges in C, which implies we cannot create new edges among nodes in C by
this rotation. It follows that this rotation decreases the total weights of graph G by the weights of
C. Finally, the expected revenue achieved by types t(1), · · · , t(l) is still the same, since Step 1 only
rotates the allocation and payment rules, and the probability of each type is the same. Combining
the fact that each node gets a weakly preferred outcome, the social welfare does not decrease.
D.2 Proof of Claim 2
Proof. In Step 2, we first prove that it can only create new edges with zero weight. A new edge
created by Step 2 can only point to a node t¯ ∈ St. We show by contradiction, suppose we create
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a positive weight edge from tˆ to t¯ ∈ St, then u(tˆ,M′(t¯))− u(tˆ,M′(tˆ)) > 0 for the current updated
mechanism M′, we have
u(tˆ,M′(tˆ)) < u(tˆ,M′(t¯)) < u(tˆ,M′(t¯)) + εt
≤ u(tˆ,M′(t¯)) + u(t′′,M′(t′′))− u(t′′,M′(t¯))
≤ u(tˆ,M′(t¯)) + u(tˆ,M′(tˆ))− u(tˆ,M′(t¯)) (By definition of t′′)
= u(tˆ,M′(tˆ)),
which proves our claim. Second, it is straightforward to verify that Step 2 doesn’t decrease social
welfare since we only decrease payment in Step 2. Finally, in Step 2, we reduce the weight of every
positive-weight outgoing edge associated with t by min{εt, ε¯t}. This is because for any node t′, s.t.
there is a positive-weight edge between t and t′, t′ cannot be the ancestor of t, otherwise, there is
already a cycle, which contradicts Step 1.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We construct the same weighted directed graph G = (T , E) as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Again, the target is to reduce the total weight of G to zero, which leads to a BIC mechanism. We
denote Me as the menus and |Me| = C, and we have for each type t(i), that there exists a menu
me ∈Me, s.t. M(t(i)) = me. If t(i) and t(j) share a same menu, i.e., M(t(i)) =M(t(j)), there is an
directed edge with weight zero from t(i) to t(j), and vice versa. We denote the distribution of each
menu me as,
g(me) =
∑
t∈T :Mε(t)=me
f(t).
Since M is ε-BIC, the weight of each edge is bounded by ε. We still apply Step 1 and Step 2
in graph G proposed in Theorem 1, however, we count the revenue loss over menu space.
First, in Step 1, we only rotate the allocation and payment (menu) along the cycle, it will not
change the allocation and payment of each menu. In addition, it will not the distribution of menus,
g(me) is preserved for each me.
In Step 2, consider a source node t, and let the corresponding menu be m′e (the output of the
current mechanism with type t). Every type with m′e is the ancestor of type t, when we decrease
the payment of type t by min{εt, ε¯t}, the payment for each type t′ associated with menu m′e will
be decreased by the same amount. If there is a type t′′ with a different menu m′′e 6= m′e and t′′ is an
ancestor of t, then all the types associated with menu m′′e are the ancestors of t. Thus, in Step 2,
the payment of the types with the same menu must be decreased by the same amount. Therefore,
Step 2 only changes the payment of each menu by the same amount, and does not change the
distribution of each menu, i.e. g(me) is the same for each me ∈Me.
Moreover, if there is an edge (t(j), t(k)) with positive weight and if t(j) and t share the same
menu, then (1) t(k) must be in different menus, and (2) t(k) is not the ancestor of t, otherwise,
there exists a cycle, which contains a positive-weight edge. Therefore, in Step 2, if we decrease the
payment of type t by min{εt, εt}, we also reduce the weight of edge (t(j), t(k)) by min{εt, εt}. In
other words, we reduce the regret of all the nodes in menu me by min{εt, εt}.
Since the weight of each edge is bounded by ε, then we may decrease the expected payment at
most ε to reduce all the regret of the nodes belonging to menu me. In total, the revenue loss is
bounded by Cε.
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D.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We construct a weighted directed graph G = (T , E), different with the one in Theorem 1.
A directed edge e = (t(j), t(k)) ∈ E is drawn from t(j) to t(k) when the outcome (allocation and
payment) of t(k) is weakly preferred by true type t(j), i.e. u(t(j),M(t(k))) ≥ u(t(j),M(t(j))), and
the weight of edge e is
w(e) = f(t(j)) · f(t(k)) ·
[
u(t(j),M(t(k)))− u(t(j),M(t(j)))
]
It is straightforward to see that M is BIC iff the total weight of all edges in G is zero.
We show the modified transformation for this setting in Fig. 4. Firstly, it is trivial that our
transformation preserves IR, since neither Step 1 nor Step 2 reduces utility. Then we show this
modified Step 1 will strictly decrease the total weights of the graph G and has no negative effect
on social welfare and revenue.
First, we observe each type in C achieves utility no worse than before, by truthful reporting.
Then, the weight of each outgoing edge from a type in C to a type in T \C will not increase.
Second, we claim the total weight of edges from any node (type) t ∈ T \C to nodes (types) in
C does not increase. To prove this, we assume w(t, t(j)) ≥ 0,∀t(j) ∈ C, i.e. there is a edge from t to
any t(j) ∈ C in G. This is WLOG, because if there is no edge between t to some t(j) ∈ C, we can
just add an edge from t to t(j) with weight zero, and this does not change the total weight of the
graph. We denote the mechanism updated after one use of Step 1 as M′, and denote the weight
function w′ for the graph G′ that is constructed from M′. Let [·]+ be the function max(·, 0). The
total weight from t to t(j) ∈ C according to the mechanism M′ = (x′, p′) is∑
t(j)∈C
w′(t, t(j))
=
l∑
j=1
f(t(j))f(t)
[
u(t,M′(t(j)))− u(t,M′(t))]
+
=
l∑
j=1
f(t(j))f(t)
[
(f(t(j))− f(t(k)))u(t,M(t(j))) + f(t(k)) · u(t,M(t(j+1)))
f(t(j))
− u(t,M(t))
]
+
(In the fractional rotation step, M′(t) =M(t),∀t ∈ T \C)
≤
l∑
j=1
f(t) ·
((
f(t(j)))− f(t(k)))[u(t,Mε(t(j)))− u(t,Mε(t))]
+
+
l∑
j=1
f(t(k))
[
u(t,M(t(j+1)))− u(t,M(t))]
+
)
(By rearranging the algebra and the fact that [x+ y]+ ≤ [x]+ + [y]+)
=
l∑
j=1
f(t(j)) · f(t) · [u(t,M(t(j)))− u(t,Mε(t))]
+
(By the fact that {t(1), · · · , t(l)} forms a cycle and t(l+1) = t(1))
=
∑
t(j)∈C
w(t, t(j))
Thus, we prove our claim that the total weight of edges from any node (type) t ∈ T \C to nodes
(types) in C does not increase.
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Modified Step 1 (Fractional rotation step). Given a mechanism M = (x, p), find the
shortest cycle C in G that contains at least one edge with positive weight in E. Without loss
of generality, we represent C = {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(l)}. Then we find the node t(k), k ∈ [l], such
that f(t(k)) = mink∈[l] f(t(k)). Next, we rotate the allocation and payment rules of types along
C with fraction of f(t(k))/f(t(j)) for each type t(j), j ∈ [l]. Now we slightly abuse the notation
of subscripts, s.t. t(l+1) = t(1). Specifically, the allocation and payment rules for each t(j),
x′(t(j)) =
[
f(t(j))− f(t(k))]x(t(j)) + f(t(k))x(t(j+1))
f(t(j))
,
p′(t(j)) =
[
f(t(j))− f(t(k))]p(t(j)) + f(t(k))p(t(j+1))
f(t(j))
.
Then we update mechanism M to adopt allocation and payment rules x′, p′ to form a new
mechanism M′ and reconstruct the graph G. If this has the effect of removing all cycles that
contain at least one positive-weight-edge in G, then move to Step 2. Otherwise, we repeat
Step 1.
Modified Step 2 (Payment reducing step). Exactly the same as Step 2 in Theorem 1.
Figure 4: ε-BIC to BIC transformation for single agent with general type distribution.
Third, by each use of modified Step 1, we remove one cycle and reduce the weight of edge
(t(i), t(i+1)) to zero, thus, we decrease the total weight at least by f(t(k))f(t(k+1))(u(t(k),M(t(k+1)))−
u(t(k),M(t(k))).
Finally, after one use of Step 1, the expected revenue achieved by types in C maintains, because
l∑
j=1
f(t(j)) · p′(t(j)) =
∑
j
(f(t(j))− f(t(k))) · p(t(j)) + f(t(k)) · p(t(j+1))
=
∑
j
f(t(j))p(t(j)) + ft(k)
∑
j
p(t(j))− p(t(j+1))
=
∑
j
f(t(j))p(t(j)) (Because t(l+1) = t(1))
The modified Step 2 is the same as Step 2 in Fig. 2. At each step 2, we decrease the total
weight of the graph by at least min{εt, εt}. We count the revenue loss as follows, in each Step 2, if
we decrease the payment of t by min{εt, εt}, the expected revenue loss is bounded by∑
j
f(t(j))min{εt, εt} ≤ min{εt, εt}
Since the weight of each edge is bounded by ε, to reduce the weight of outgoing edges of t to
zero, we may decrease the expected revenue by ε. Therefore, in total, the expected revenue loss is
bounded by mε.
D.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We construct the type distribution and the ε-EEIC mechanism similar to the one in The-
orem 2. We consider a single agent with m types T = {t(1), · · · , t(m)}. The type distribution is
f(t(1)) = 12 − ε2m , f(t(2)) = ε2m and f(t(j)) = 12(m−2) ,∀j ≥ 3. The agent with type t(1) values
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outcome 1 at ε and the other outcomes at 0. For any type t(j), j ≥ 2, the agent with type t(j)
values outcome j − 1 at m + (j − 1)ε, outcome j at m + (j − 1)ε, and the other outcomes at 0.
The mechanism we consider is: (1) if the agent reports type t(1), gives the outcome 1 to the agent
and charges ε. (2) if the agent reports t(j), j ≥ 2, gives the outcome j to the agent and charges
m+(j−1)ε. There is a m regret to the agent for not misreporting type t(1) with true type t(2) and
a regret ε for not reporting t(j) with true type t(j+1), for any j ≥ 2. It is easy to verify that this
mechanism is ε-EEIC (the probability of type t(2) is small) and already maximizes social welfare.
Thus, we can only change the payment to reduce the regret of each type. Following the same
argument as in Theorem 2, to reduce all the regret of the types, the revenue loss in total is at least
f(t(2))m+
m∑
j=3
f(t(j))(m+ (j − 2)ε) = ε
2
+
1
2(m− 2)
m∑
j=3
m+ (j − 2)ε
=
ε
2
+
m
2
+
(m− 1)ε
4
≥ m
2
D.6 Proof of Theorem 6
The earlier proof approach for single agent case does not immediately extend to the multi-agent
setting. However, since our target is a BIC mechanism, we can work with interim rules (see
Definition 1), and this provides an approach to the transformation. The interim rules reduce the
dimension of type space and separate the type of each agent. With this, we can construct a separate
type graph for each agent, now based on the interim rules.
To simplify the presentation, we define the induced mechanism for each agent i of a mechanism
M as follows.
Definition 11 (Induced Mechanism). For a mechanism M = (x, p), an induced mechanism M˜i =
(Xi, Pi) is a pair of interum allocation rule Xi : Ti → ∆(O) and interim payment rule Pi : Ti → R≥0.
Denote the utility function ui(ti,M˜i(ti)) = vi(ti,Xi(ti))− Pi(ti).
The following lemma shows that given an ε-BIC/ε-EEIC mechanism, then the induced mecha-
nism for each agent is also ε-BIC/ε-EEIC.
Lemma 1. For a ε-EEIC/ε-BIC mechanism M, any induced mechanism M˜i for each agent i is
ε-EEIC/ε-BIC.
Proof. By ε-BIC definition, each induced mechanism M˜i must be ε-BIC, if the original mechanism
M is ε-BIC. Now, we turn to consider ε-EEIC mechanism M, for any induced mechanism M˜i
Eti∼Fi
[
max
t′i∈Ti
ui(ti,M˜i(t′i))− ui(ti,M˜i(ti))
]
= Eti∼Fi
[
max
t′i∈Ti
Et−i∼F−i
[
ui(ti,M(t′i; t−i))− ui(ti,M(ti; t−i))
]]
≤ Eti∼Fi
[
Et−i∼F−i
[
max
t′i∈Ti
ui(ti,M(t′i; t−i))− ui(ti,M(ti; t−i))
]]
(By Jenson’s inequality and convexity of max function)
= Et∼F
[
max
t′i∈Ti
ui(ti,M(t′i; t−i))− ui(ti,M(ti; t−i))
]
(By independence of agents’ types)
≤ ε.
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Given Lemma 1, we can construct a single type graph for each agent based on the induced
mechanism and apply the same technique for each graph as the one in Theorem 4. The challenge
will be to also handle feasibility of the resulting mechanism. We summarize these approaches in
the following proof for Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. Here, we focus on the ε-BIC setting. The proof for ε-EEIC with independent
uniform type distribution is analogous.
We construct a graph Gi = (Ti, Ei) for each agent i ∈ [n], such that there is a directed edge
from t
(j)
i to t
(k)
i if and only if u(t
(j)
i ,M˜εi(t(k)i )) ≥ u(t(j)i ,M˜εi(t(j)i )) and the weight is
wi((t
(j)
i , t
(k)
i )) = fi(t
j) · fi(t(k)i ) ·
(
u(t
(j)
i ,M˜i(t(k)i ))− u(t(j)i ,M˜i(t(j)i )
)
Based on Lemma 1, each graph is constructed by an ε-BIC induced mechanism M˜εi, we can
apply the same constructive proof in Theorem 4 to reduce the total weight of each graph Gi to
be 0. An astute reader may have already realized that changing type graph Gi may affect other
graphs, since we probably change the distribution of the reported type of agent i. However, in our
transformation, both Step 1 and Step 2 don’t change the density probability of each type (we only
change the interim allocation and payment for each type), therefore when we do transformation for
one type graph Gi of agent i, it has no effect on the interim rules of the other agents.
Here, if the total weight of all graphs Gi are all 0, it implies that any induced mechanism M˜εi
is IC. Therefore, we make the mechanism BIC. Similarly, the new mechanism after transformation
achieves at least the same social welfare and the revenue loss of each graph Gi is bounded by miε,
Hence, the total revenue loss is bounded by
∑n
i=1miε =
∑n
i=1 |Ti|ε.
What is left to show is that using modified steps 1 and 2 on each graph Gi shown in Theorem 4
does not violate the feasibility of the mechanism. We only change the allocation of each type in
modified Step 1 (Rotation step). Denote by Xi the interim allocation for agent i before one rotation
step, and let X ′i denote the updated interim allocation for agent i after one rotation step. We then
claim in the modified Step 1 in Theorem 4,∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti)Xi(ti) =
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti)X
′
i(ti).
To prove this claim, WLOG, we consider a l length cycle C = {t(1)i , t(2)i , · · · , t(l)i } in modified
Step 1. Let k = argminj∈[l] fi(t(j)). We observe the interim allocation of the types in Ti\C don’t
change in modified Step 1, i.e., ∀ti ∈ Ti\C,Xi(ti) = X ′i(ti). We slightly abuse the notation here,
and let t(l+1) = t(1). For the types in cycle C,∑
j∈[l]
fi(t
(j))X ′i(t
(j)) =
∑
j∈[l]
f(t(j)) · (f(t
(j))− f(t(k)))Xi(t(k)) + f(t(k)) ·Xi(t(j+1))
f(t(j))
=
∑
j∈[l]
fi(t
(j))Xi(t
(j)),
which validates the claim. Therefore, by Border’s lemma (Border, 1991), the rotation step maintains
the feasibility of the allocation.
Running time. Suppose we have oracle access to the interim quantities of the original mech-
anism, we can build each Gi in poly(|Ti|, ε) time. Then, the running time for each type graph
Gi is poly(|Ti|, ε) following the same argument for single agent. In total the running time is
ploy(
∑
i |Ti|, ε).
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D.7 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. It is straightforward to construct an example such that the type graph of each agent in-
duced by the interim rules is the same as the type graph constructed by the mechanism shown
in Theorem 2. For instance, agent i values outcomes {o(1)i , · · · , o(mi)i } in the same way as the
one constructed in Theorem 2. We assume the outcome o
(j)
i are disjoint, for any i and j ∈ [mi].
Indeed, this is also ε-DSIC mechanism. Thus, we show for this case, that the revenue loss must
be at least Ω(
∑
i |Ti|ε), if we want to maintain the social welfare, following the same argument in
Theorem 2.
D.8 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Consider a setting with two items A and B and two unit-demand agents 1 and 2. The two
agents share the same preference order on items. Moreover, agent 1 is informed about which is
better, while agent 2 has no information. Agent 1 values the better item at 1 + ε and the other
item at 1. Agent 2 values the better item at 2 and the other item at 0.
There exists an ε-IC mechanism: ask agent 1 which item is better, and give this item to agent
2 for a price of 2 and give agent 1 the other item for a price of 1. The total welfare and revenue is 3
if agent 1 reports truthfully. Bidder 1 can get ε more utility by misreporting, in which case it will
get the better item for the same price. From this, we can confirm that this is an ε-IC mechanism.
For any IC mechanism, by weak monotonicity, we have vA(x(A)) − vA(x(B)) ≥ vB(x(A)) −
vB(x(B)), where vA be the type that the better item is A, and similarly for vB. x(A) is the
allocation if agent 1 reports A the better item and similarly for x(B). This means that when agent
1 reporting A rather than B, either agent 1 is assigned item A with weakly higher probability, or
agent 1 is assigned item B with weakly less probability. We only consider the former case, and the
latter one holds analogously. In the former case, we have either:
(1) agent 1 is getting at least half of A when reporting A, and the total revenue and social
welfare are each at most 0.5 × 2 + 0.5 × (1 + ǫ) + 1 = 2.5 + ǫ/2, or
(2) agent 1 is getting at most half of A when reporting B, and the total revenue and social
welfare are each at most 2 + 0.5 = 2.5.
Either way, we will definitely lose at least 0.5− ε/2 for revenue and social welfare when making
the ε-IC mechanism above BIC.
D.9 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. The construction of this ε-BIC mechanism is strictly generalized by the mechanism in (Yao,
2017). Consider a 2-agent, 2-item auction, each agent i values item j, tij . tij is i.i.d sampled from
a uniform distribution over set {1, 2}, i.e. P(tij = 1) = P(tij = 2) = 0.5. The ε-BIC mechanism is
shown as below,
If t2 = (1, 1), give both items to agent 1 for a price of 3.
If t2 = (1, 2) and t1 = (1, 2), give both items randomly to agent 1 or 2 for a price of 1.5.
If t1 = (2, 1) and t2 = (1, 2), give item 1 to agent 1 and give item 2 to agent 2, with a
price of 2 for each.
If t2 = (1, 2) and t1 = (2, 2), give both items to agent 1 for a price 3.75 + ε.
If t1 = t2 = (2, 2), give both items randomly to agent 1 or agent 2 for a price 2.
For other cases, we get the mechanism by the symmetries of items and agents.
It is straightforward to verify that this is an ε-BIC mechanism and the expected revenue is
3.1875+ ε/16. However, Yao (2017) characterizes that optimal DSIC mechanism achieves expected
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3.125. This conclude the proof.
E Omitted Details of Applications
In this section, we give a brief introduction to LP-based AMD and RegretNet AMD.
E.1 LP-based Approach
The LP-based approach considered in this paper is initiated by (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002).
We consider n agents with type distribution F defined on T . For each type profile t ∈ T and each
outcome ok ∈ O, we define xk(t) as the probability of choosing ok when the reported types are t
and pi(t) as the expected payment of agent i when the reported types are t. x
k(t) and pi(t) are
both decision variables.
Then we can formulate the mechanism design problem as the following linear programming,
max
x,p
(1− λ)Et∼F
[∑
i
pi(t)
]
+ λEt∼F
 ∑
k:ok∈O
xk(t)
∑
i
vi(ti, ok)

s.t. Et−i
 ∑
k:ok∈O
xk(ti, t−i)vi(ti, ok)− pi(ti, t−i)
 ≥ Et−i
 ∑
k:ok∈O
xk(t′i, t−i)vi(ti, ok)− pi(t′i, t−i)
 ,∀i, ti, t′i
Et−i
 ∑
k:ok∈O
xk(t)vi(ti, ok)− pi(t)
 ≥ 0,∀i, t
where the first constraint is for BIC and the second is for interim-IR. In this case, the type space T
is discrete, thus the expectation can be explicitly represented as the linear function with decision
variables.
E.2 RegretNet Approach
RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019) is a generic data-driven, deep learning framework for multi-
dimensional mechanism design. We only briefly introduce the RegretNet framework here and refer
the readers to (Duetting et al., 2019) for more details.
RegretNet uses a deep neural network parameterized by w ∈ Rd to model the mechanism M,
as well as the valuation (through allocation function xw : T → ∆(O)) and payment functions:
vwi : Ti ×∆(O)→ R≥0 and pwi : T → R≥0. Denote utility function as,
uwi (ti, tˆ) = vi(ti, x
w(tˆ))− pwi (tˆ).
RegretNet is trained on a training data set S of S type profiles i.i.d sampled from F to maximize
the empirical revenue subject to the empirical regret being zero for all agents:
max
w∈Rd
1− λ
S
∑
t∈S
n∑
i=1
pwi (t) +
λ
S
∑
t∈S
n∑
i=1
vwi (ti, x(t))
s.t.
1
S
∑
t∈S
[
max
t′i∈Ti
uwi (ti, (t
′
i, t−i))− uwi (ti, t)
]
= 0,∀i
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The objective is the empirical version of learning target in 7. The constraint is for EEIC requirement
and IR is hard coded in RegretNet to be guaranteed. Let H be the functional class modeled by
RegretNet through parameters w. In this paper, we assume there exists an PAC learning algorithm
that can produce a RegretNet to model an ε-EEIC mechanism M ∈ H defined on F , such that
µλ(M′,F) ≥ sup
Mˆ∈H
µλ(Mˆ,F)− (1− λ)
n∑
i=1
|Ti|ε− ε,
holds with probability at least 1− δ, by observing S = S(ε, δ) i.i.d samples from F .
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